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Introduction
Housing construction in the United States has not kept pace with demand. Freddie
Mac (2018) estimates that 2017 production fell 20 percent short of the level required to
accommodate population growth and replace dilapidated structures. This not only affects
housing markets, where costs continue to rise faster than incomes (Albouy, Ehrlich, and Liu
2016), but may also slow aggregate economic growth (Hsieh and Moretti 2019). Accordingly,
ways to address this shortfall have come to the forefront of the policy debate.
The highly decentralized control of land-use regulation and development approval may
create a classic NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) problem that contributes to the shortfall.
Because new housing has diffuse benefits and concentrated costs—such as congestion, lost
green space, and construction noise—people may prefer less construction near their residence
than would be optimal for the town or region. Moreover, citizens can use their outsized
influence over proposals in their area to restrict production. Towns within a region can use
locally controlled land-use regulations to behave similarly. Anecdotally, these forces seem
to be strong, leading to recent reforms that reduce local control of land-use regulations in
an attempt to increase housing supply.1 However, there is little empirical evidence on how
local control of regulation affects housing supply, likely because of the difficulty of isolating
relevant exogenous variation.
In this paper, I obtain causal estimates of the effect of increased local control on housing
production by exploiting a common reform to town council elections. The reform is a change
from “at-large” elections, in which citizens vote for candidates to represent the town as a
whole, to “ward” elections, in which the town is divided into wards and each citizen votes
for a single candidate to represent their area. This change decentralizes town governance,
as at-large representatives should be responsive to the town’s median voter, while ward
representatives should respond to the median in their district. Moreover, informal practices
like logrolling and aldermanic privilege often give ward representatives significant control over
issues in their district, due to deference from their counterparts in other wards (Schleicher
2013).
1Elmendorf (2019) describes California’s requirements for municipal housing production and Oregon’s
recent prohibition of single-family zoning in most municipalities.
1
I use a difference-in-differences (DD) approach to evaluate the effect of switching from
at-large to ward voting.2 The baseline specification uses all initially at-large towns as a
control group and includes county-year fixed effects to account for granular spatial trends.3
However, causal identification is complicated by the fact that towns choose their election
type, making switches endogenous. Historically, this choice has been strongly influenced by
racial dynamics. White majorities used at-large systems to limit minority representation,
creating equity concerns that led to court cases and legislation in the 1980s that caused many
towns to switch to ward voting (Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina 2008). Towns that switched
are thus on average bigger and less white than towns that remained on at-large voting.
However, their housing markets are similar, consistent with evidence that housing concerns
rarely motivate switches (Hankinson and Magazinnik 2019), and demographic pretrends are
similar within counties, supporting the parallel trends identification assumption.
Event study results show that, prior to changing to ward voting, treated and control towns
were on very similar housing production trends. However, the number of units permitted falls
sharply in treated towns immediately upon the reform’s approval, leading to a DD estimate
of −24 percent. Significant heterogeneity underlies this average effect—effects are larger
(−47 percent) for multifamily units and in towns with higher owner-occupancy rates. This is
consistent with anecdotally stronger development opposition from homeowners (Fischel 2001)
and toward larger projects. Results are similar using a matched control group or including
only treated towns in the sample, alleviating concerns about preexisting differences between
treatment and control towns. While I cannot determine the relative importance of ward
representatives blocking projects in their districts and ward councils passing more restrictive
regulation, extensions suggest that results are not driven by indirect effects of nonhousing
policy.
I also consider units financed using federal Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC).
While the average effect on permitting any LIHTC units is zero, point estimates are negative
in high-homeownership towns and positive in others. Diamond and McQuade’s (2019) finding
2I focus on reforms from at-large to ward voting, rather than also including ward to at-large, because
the survey I use to identify reforms does not ask about ward to at-large in every wave. Moreover, switches
from ward to at-large are much less common.
3The sample contains municipalities of many types, but I refer to all as towns for simplicity.
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of positive effects of LIHTC on home values in low-income areas and negative in high-income
areas suggests an explanation. Ward voting in wealthy high-ownership areas could empower
residents who want to protect their property values, while in low-ownership places it allows
low-income districts to gain representation and advocate for the benefits of LIHTC.
On the whole, more localized control severely reduces housing production, which has
important policy implications for areas trying to increase supply. Towns with ward elec-
tions may need to increase the set of structures can be built “as-of-right” (without a special
approval process) or reduce the formal and informal policies giving council members more
power over developments in their district. Extrapolating to a parallel setting, regional orga-
nizations or state governments may need to set minimum standards for housing production
or limits on the restrictiveness of municipal land-use regulations.
The most directly related literature studies land-use regulation and housing markets.
As reviewed in Gyourko and Molloy (2015), many studies have shown a robust relationship
between tighter regulation and lower housing construction, as well as higher prices.4 I add
to this literature first by providing a quasi-experimental analysis of the switch from at-large
to ward elections, which, given the power of town councils in this setting, is reasonable to
consider as a change to land-use policy. In addition, like Parkhomenko (2018) and Duranton
and Puga (2019), this paper connects endogenous local land-use regulations and housing
approval to the underlying institutions and economic forces that generate them, empirically
showing the importance of local control and NIMBYism. Concurrent work by Hankinson and
Magazinnik (2019) is most closely related. They use more spatially detailed data to identify
a large negative effect of ward voting on multifamily units in California between 2010 and
2018, as well as a shift in permit location within towns, while I use a longer national sample
that provides more precise, representative, and long-run estimates.5
More broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on decentralization and fiscal fed-
eralism. Most directly related is the NIMBY literature, which has largely focused on mecha-
nisms to fairly allocate socially necessary but locally undesirable land uses (Frey, Oberholzer-
4See, for example, Ihlanfeldt (2007), Glaeser and Ward (2009), Pollakowski and Wachter (1990), and
Quigley and Raphael (2004).
5In addition, Feiock, Tavares, and Lubell (2008), Clingermayer (1994), and Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez
De La Cruz (2009) document a negative correlation between ward voting and housing supply.
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Fee, and Eichenberger 1996, Feinerman, Finkelshtain, and Kan 2004, Levinson 1999). This
study is among the first to obtain a causal estimate of how changes to local control affect
the quantity of such a land use.
1 Background on Electoral Reforms
1.1 At-Large and Ward Elections
Towns in the United States generally use one of two methods to aggregate individual
votes into seats on their council. In at-large elections, each citizen chooses from the same
pool of candidates to elect representatives who represent the town as a whole. In ward
elections, the city is divided into smaller wards (or districts) in which each citizen votes for
a single candidate to represent their area. About two-thirds of towns use at-large elections
for town council, about 15 percent of towns use a purely ward system, and 20 percent have
some representatives elected at-large and some by ward (Clark and Krebs 2012).
Towns are able to choose between different election types, and a literature in both political
science and economics studies the determinants of that choice. In theory, any majority
bloc—whether defined by race, ideology, or ethnicity—can suppress the representation of a
minority bloc through at-large voting (Davidson and Korbel 1981). For example, a minority
representing 15 percent of the population may not be able to win a seat in an at-large election
but could constitute a majority within a smaller ward. In recent years, the majority and
minority in the United States have typically been defined by racial lines. Trebbi, Aghion,
and Alesina (2008) show that majority-white Southern towns implemented at-large systems
after African American voting rights were strengthened by the Voting Rights Act, and a
number of studies have found that ward voting indeed increases the representation of racial
minorities.6
Accordingly, changes between the two electoral rules have often been motivated by racial
equity concerns. A key 1982 Supreme Court case held that at-large elections in Burke
County, Georgia, violated the 14th Amendment rights of African Americans in the county,
6See, for example, Engstrom and McDonald (1981), Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier (2004), and Trebbi,
Aghion, and Alesina (2008).
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sparking a wave of switches to ward voting in the 1980s and 1990s.7 While there are other
reasons towns may switch to ward voting, in the 1991 Form of Government Survey from the
International City/County Management Association, 31 percent of the 77 switching towns
cite either a court or state mandate. An additional 20 percent cite a government initiative,
29 percent a referendum, and 21 percent another (unlisted) reason. Of course, these other
reforms could also have been indirectly motivated by court precedent. Importantly, housing
markets, to my knowledge, are rarely cited as an inspiration for reform, as Hankinson and
Magazinnik (2019) carefully document in the meeting minutes of several California cities
that switched to ward voting.
1.2 Differences in Representative Incentives
Ward systems are more decentralized than at-large, since representation is tied to smaller
groups of people. This leads ward and at-large representatives to face very different incen-
tives. In classic models, at-large representatives are responsive to the town’s median voter,
while ward representatives should respond to the median voter in their district.8 This dif-
ference is likely important for housing approvals. Within the ward containing a proposed
development, a higher percentage of people will be affected by the project’s concentrated
costs—such as construction noise, lost green space or views, and congestion—than in the
town as a whole. This means that the ward’s median voter will have a more negative opin-
ion of a proposal than the town’s median voter, making ward representatives less likely to
support housing developments.
However, differences between the two systems go beyond changes to the median voter. In
ward systems, the representative for the district containing a proposed development often has
a disproportionate influence over its approval due to logrolling and “aldermanic privilege,”
informal practices in which council members defer to the home representative and, in return,
receive the same treatment when an issue arises in their ward. This dynamic not only
increases the power of ward representatives, but may also lead ward councils to pass more
7Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613.
8See Trounstine (2010), Clark and Krebs (2012), Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2014), and Schleicher
(2013).
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restrictive land-use regulation in general, in order to increase the proportion of projects
requiring special council approvals and further expand their influence over their districts.
Because housing is such a local issue, decentralization even within one town can have
important effects. Of course, similar forces apply at other geographic levels. For example,
allowing towns instead of counties or other regional bodies to set land-use regulations could
decrease housing supply, since a town also absorbs more of a new development’s costs and
fewer of its benefits than a larger region. More broadly, decentralization leads to similarly
misaligned local and regional incentives in many classic NIMBY problems.
2 Data and Sample Construction
2.1 Data Sources
ICMA Data. Electoral reforms are identified using the International City/County Man-
agement Association (ICMA) Municipal Form of Government survey. The ICMA surveys
towns (identified by census place codes) on their election type and form of government every
five years and receives approximately 3,500–5,000 responses.9 Trebbi, Aghion, and Alesina
(2008) also use this data to study changes in electoral rules and show that the sample is
representative of the set of U.S. towns with population over 2,500.10
To identify changes from at-large to ward voting, I use the survey question that asks
whether a town made this change in the past five years, and, if so, when the reform was
approved.11 Across seven waves of the survey (from 1981 to 2011), this identifies nearly 300
municipalities that switched from at-large to purely ward elections at some point between
1970 and 2011. These switches occur across all decades, with 112 and 103 in the 1980s and
1990s and 21 and 30 in the 1970s and 2000s. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the full distribution
across years.
Because the survey has an imperfect response rate, this approach will miss some changes
in electoral rules. However, given the relative infrequency of reforms among survey respon-
9The response rate varies from 70 percent in 1981 to 40 percent in 2011 and is similar across towns of
different populations.
10Towns with populations below this threshold are only surveyed if they have an ICMA affiliation.
11The 1981 survey asks about reforms between 1970 and 1981, expanding the observation window.
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dents (<1 percent), this should be a small proportion of the control group. In addition,
the control group ultimately includes only towns that always report at-large voting, further
minimizing the issue. Finally, while some towns do report switching from ward to at-large
systems, it is much less common, so much so that ICMA does not ask about these switches
in most waves of the survey. In robustness checks, I probe the treatment definition and, to
the extent possible, also consider ward to at-large switches.
Census Building Permit Data. Census place-level data on new housing permits comes
from the 1980–2018 waves of the Census Bureau Building Permit Survey. Each year, the
Census Bureau surveys about 20,000 permit-granting local governments that represent 98
percent of U.S. housing production. The census’s follow-up surveys show that almost all
permitted units are eventually built, making the permits a reasonable measure of housing
construction. The data include both the total number of units permitted and the number
permitted in single-family and multifamily structures.12 Appendix Figure A.2 shows the time
series of units permitted, which is highly correlated with the business cycle, as expected.
LIHTC Data. Data on buildings receiving Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
financing is provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and covers
all LIHTC buildings permitted between 1986 and 2015, providing details such as number of
units in each building and percent of units at various levels of income restriction. I aggregate
these to the census place level in order to merge with the other data sets.
2.2 Sample Construction
I merge these three data sources to construct the analysis sample. After removing unin-
corporated areas from the building permit data, roughly 16,000 towns can be linked across
all years of the survey. Of these, I keep only the 5,830 that can be matched to at least
one ICMA survey wave. Next, about 6.5 percent of town-years and 60 percent of towns are
matched to at least one LIHTC project, and I assume that town-years in the time frame
covered by the LIHTC data that are not matched to the LIHTC data saw no such units
permitted.
12The census imputes values in the event that a town does not respond to the survey, but I drop these
observations from the sample.
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I then apply several restrictions to complete the final analysis sample. First, I drop town-
years with population below 2,500, which are poorly represented in the ICMA data. Second,
in order to improve the comparability of the treatment and control groups, I keep only towns
that either report switching from at-large to ward or always report at-large voting. Third, for
simplicity, I drop the additional 46 towns that switch from at-large to a mixed system with
some ward and some at-large representatives.13 The final sample contains approximately
2,500 towns in the years 1980–2018 and includes 240 at-large to ward transitions.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Baseline Specification
I study the effect of changing to ward voting using a DD strategy. The outcome variables
are measures y of regular and low-income housing permits, and the treated group is towns
that made this switch. In the baseline specification, the control group is all at-large voting
towns, and I include county-year fixed effects to nonparametrically control for local trends.
In alternative specifications, I show that using a matched control group or including only
treated towns return similar results.
In order to investigate pretrends and effect dynamics, I first estimate the following event
study specification for town i in county c in year t :
yit = γi + αct +
∑
k∈C
βkd
k
it + it. (1)
I define C and dkit such that the d variables represent time-to-treatment dummies with a
two-year window. This requires C = { -8, -6, -4, -2, 0, 2, 4, 6, 7 } and
13I note two other small data issues. First, because the 1986 survey does not ask for the year the reform
occurred, I classify all towns that reported switching in this time period as doing so in 1984 for the main
analysis. In addition, I drop the 10 towns that report switching from at-large to ward twice. These typically
appear to be errors in which towns report switching in, for example, 1991 in the 1991 survey and 1992 in
the 1996 survey.
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dkit =

1[t ≤ t∗i − 8] if k = −8
1[t∗i + k − 1 ≤ t ≤ t∗i + k] if − 8 < k < 7
1[t ≥ t∗i + 7] if k = 7
for a town that approved the reform in year t∗ and 0 for other towns. Because reforms are
likely under discussion for some time prior to approval, potentially affecting permits prior to
t∗, I set 2–3 years before the reform as the omitted coefficient. I also include only years from
1980 to 2003 (recall that the treatment variable is observed from 1970 to 2011) to ensure
that all dkit are correctly defined, following Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2019).
Following the event study, I estimate an average effect of treatment by replacing the
years-to-treatment dummies with a single after-treatment dummy:
yit = γi + αct + β1(t ≥ t∗i ) + it. (2)
Recent work has pointed to problems with DD with staggered treatments.14 A theme across
these papers is that the estimator may not yield a sensible weighted average if treatment
effects are heterogeneous over time or if the specification implicitly uses already-treated
units as a large share of its control units. To minimize these problems, I drop town-years
that are more than seven years after treatment from this specification, and I discuss related
robustness checks with the main results.
Because of the skewed distribution of units permitted, I use the log of units (plus one)
as the dependent variable for market-rate units. Fewer than 10 percent of town-years have
no permits, mitigating potential issues with the discontinuity at zero. For LIHTC units, I
instead use an indicator for whether a town permitted any LIHTC units in a year. This is
because the number of LIHTC units permitted in a town-year is very lumpy—fewer than 10
percent of town-years permit any units, but those that do permit an average of 101. Finally,
in all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the state level.
14See de Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2019), Goodman-Bacon (2018), and Callaway and Sant’Anna
(2019).
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3.2 Identification
In the baseline specification, the identification assumption is that, in the absence of an
electoral reform, housing permits would have changed in parallel for towns that switched
from at-large to ward voting and other initially at-large towns in the same county. The
primary threats to this assumption arise because towns generally choose if and when to
make this switch (or are compelled by the courts). I investigate this assumption in Table 1.
In Panel A, I regress several characteristics on an indicator for whether a town ever
switches, and, depending on the specification, either county-year or year fixed effects.15
Because characteristics are only observed in the decennial census years, I include only those
years in the sample, and I drop postreform observations in treated towns to avoid conflating
baseline differences and the treatment effect. Towns that switch are significantly larger
and less white, on average, which makes sense given that reforms are often motivated by
concerns about underrepresentation of nonwhite populations, implying that switching towns
must have some presence of these groups. However, the difference in housing units permitted
per capita is near zero when including county-year effects, and the difference in the rate of
homeownership is only 6 percent on a base of 62 percent. This similarity in housing markets
fits with anecdotal evidence that reforms typically are not driven by housing concerns.
Although levels of characteristics suggest the decision to switch to ward voting is not
random, this does not necessarily violate the parallel trends identification assumption. Panel
B of Table 1 assesses differences in trends by repeating the exercise in Panel A using 10-
year changes in town characteristics as the dependent variable. With the county-year fixed
effects used in the baseline specification, the treatment indicator is statistically insignificant
for all outcomes, suggesting that treated towns were evolving similarly to towns in the
same county—the relevant comparison for the identification assumption. In addition to the
exercises in this table, the event study plots presented with the main results show parallel
trends in housing production during the preperiod, further supporting the identification
assumption.
15Appendix Table A.1 shows raw characteristics for treatment and control towns in the preperiod.
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3.3 Alternative Specifications
Although treated and control towns within counties appear to be on similar trends, the
differences in size and racial composition motivate two alternative specifications. First, I
include only towns that undergo a reform at some point during the sample. Because this
greatly shrinks the sample, I coarsen the time fixed effects to state-year. The concern in this
specification is that the timing of the decision to switch to ward voting may be correlated
with changes in housing development. To assess this, I restrict to the sample of treated towns
and regress changes in town characteristics on a dummy for the decade prior to a reform and
a set of town fixed effects, as well as either year or state-year fixed effects. The coefficients of
interest, shown in Panel C of Table 1, are all small and statistically insignificant, suggesting
that reform timing is not correlated with changes in local housing markets.
In the second alternative specification, I construct a control group of at-large towns that
are observably similar to the switching towns. I match each switching town to its five nearest
neighbors among at-large towns in the same state, based on population, percent white, and
percent homeownership, all measured in 1980.16 I do this with replacement, allowing control
towns to be matched to multiple treatment towns. I then include all towns that are matched
to any treatment town in the control group. Because this sample is smaller than the baseline,
I again coarsen the time fixed effects to state-year.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Baseline event study results for log housing units permitted plus one are shown in Figure
1. Pretrends appear to be minimal, suggesting that at-large towns serve as an effective
control group despite being different on some characteristics. However, there is a stark
change following the reform’s approval, with housing permits falling in treated towns. The
effect appears to begin immediately in the treatment year and reach a stable level by two
years later, where it remains until the end of the sample. Figure 2 repeats the event study
16To ensure that these are prereform characteristics, I drop the small number of reforms prior to 1980.
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specification separately for single-family and multifamily units. While the pattern of parallel
pretrends followed by a sharp decline is the same for both outcomes, the effect is much
larger for multifamily units. In addition, for multifamily units, the effect is less stable in the
postperiod, perhaps because the lumpy nature of multifamily buildings creates more noise.
The DD results shown in Panel A of Table 2 approximate the average effect of decen-
tralization over the seven years after the reform. The after-treatment coefficient is -0.236
(S.E. = 0.059, p<0.01) when using all units as the outcome variable, suggesting that reforms
reduced housing permits by over 20 percent.17 The median number of units permitted in a
year is 25, pointing to an absolute decrease of about 5 units. The estimates for single- and
multifamily units are -0.118 (S.E. = 0.055, p=0.04) and -0.478 (S.E. = 0.145, p<0.01), con-
sistent with the larger change observed in the multifamily event study. The larger estimates
for multifamily could occur either because neighbors oppose larger projects more strongly, or
because the approval process for multifamily is often more onerous and could provide more
opportunities for a ward representative to block a project.
Next, I turn to LIHTC permits. In Table 2, Column 4 of Panel A shows the baseline
effect on the probability that any LIHTC units are permitted, which is less than a tenth of a
percent. The underlying event study plot, shown in Appendix Figure A.3, does not suggest
that this null average effect masks any interesting time trends. However, as discussed below
in Section 4.3, there is important heterogeneity across towns underlying the overall effect.
Results from alternative specifications support the baseline estimates. The DD estimates
are extremely similar when including only treated towns (Table 2, Panel B), and the cor-
responding event studies (Appendix Figures A.4 and A.5) also change minimally. When
using a matched control group, estimates are smaller but tell a similar story (Panel C of
Table 2, Appendix Figures A.6 and A.7). Total units decline by 12.3 percent (S.E. = 0.041,
p=0.06) and multifamily units decline by 22.9 percent (S.E. = 0.065, p<0.01). The effect
on single-family units is negative but not statistically significant.18
17Appendix Table A.2 shows estimates of the effect on total units under tweaks to the specification. In
Columns 1 and 2, neither using the inverse hyperbolic sine to construct the dependent variable nor removing
the restriction on the number of posttreatment years affects results. Because reforms may take time to pass,
leading to an effect before their official approval, I drop the treatment year and the prior year in Column 3
and find little change. Finally, in Column 4, including time-varying controls for population, percent white,
and percent owner occupied makes little difference.
18In addition to alternative specifications, I consider alternative treatment definitions in Appendix Table
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A recent literature highlights a number of potential issues with DD designs exploiting
staggered treatments. Focusing first on the event study approach, Abraham and Sun (2019)
show that the primary assumption required for consistent estimates is that treatment effect
dynamics are similar across cohorts treated in different years. To investigate, I plot event
studies including only towns treated before 1995 (representing the earlier 75 percent of towns)
and only towns treated after 1986 (the later 75 percent) on the same axis in Appendix Figure
A.8. The plots are encouragingly similar in both magnitude and dynamics.
Turning to the DD specifications, estimates may be inconsistent if treatment effects
change over time (Goodman-Bacon 2018; Callaway and Sant’Anna 2019). The stability of
postperiod coefficients in the event study plots is encouraging on this front. Heterogeneity
across towns can also cause problems, as shown in de Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille
(2019), because the overall DD estimate is a weighted average of subgroup effects that may
include negative weights, which can lead the overall estimate to have a different sign than
the underlying comparisons. However, following their suggested methodology to estimate
the significance of negative weights in my baseline estimate, I find that only 2.1 percent of
comparisons receive negative weight, summing to a total of −0.0000322. This suggests that
the overall estimate represents a relevant combination of underlying effects.
4.2 Heterogeneity by Homeownership
Differences in how decentralization affects housing markets across towns may be im-
portant for how metropolitan areas grow, as well as the impact of reforms to land use or
local control. A wealth of research, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggests that NIMBYism
is strongest in areas with high owner-occupancy rates. Homeowners may be particularly
opposed to development because of their direct stake in property values, which could be
reduced by increased supply or congestion effects, and because they are likely to remain in
A.3. First, I include towns that report an at-large council in one survey wave and ward in the next but do
not explicitly report a reform, setting the treatment year to the midpoint of the gap between their survey
responses. As shown in Panel A, the treatment effect shrinks, perhaps reflecting measurement error in the
new definition, but remains negative and statistically significant. Panel B expands the treatment definition
to include at-large to mixed switches, which again slightly shrinks estimates. Finally, Panel C defines the
treatment as reporting a ward system in one wave and an at-large in the next. All coefficients are near zero,
suggesting that government disruption associated with a reform of any type does not drive the main results.
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the area for longer than renters (Fischel 2001). Homeowners are also more likely to attend
community meetings on new developments (Einstein, Palmer, and Glick 2019) and less likely
to support developments when the site is closer to their residence (Hankinson 2018).
To test the importance of homeownership, I repeat the baseline DD specification, but
allow switching towns with above-median ownership rates to have a different treatment effect.
Adding this interaction term and a vector of year × above-median ownership fixed effects
yields
yit = γi + αct + κht + β11(t ≥ t∗i ) + β21(t ≥ t∗i )× 1(h = 1) + it, (3)
where h is an indicator for above-median owner occupancy.
Results are shown in Table 3. For total market-rate permits, the interaction term is
negative but statistically insignificant in all of the baseline, only-treated, and matched-
control specifications. However, the estimates are much larger for multifamily units. The
interaction term is −0.522 (S.E.=0.32, p=0.11) in the baseline, versus a −0.202 average
effect, and −0.72 (S.E.=0.24, p<0.01) and −0.313 (S.E.=0.24, p=0.19) in the only-treated
and matched sample specifications. Though these results are noisy and not all statistically
significant, they provide suggestive evidence that the effect of ward voting on multifamily
housing is larger in high homeownership towns.
Finally, Column 4 of Table 3 shows results for LIHTC permits. Interestingly, the null
average effect found in the previous section appears to be composed of very different effects
in low- and high-ownership places. In the baseline specification, the average effect is a
statistically insignificant 0.029, and the interaction term is −0.074 (S.E. = 0.034, p<0.035).
These sum to a total effect of −0.045 (S.E. = 0.018, p=0.02) for high-ownership towns.
Similarly, in the matched specification, the average effect is positive but only marginally
significant, while the interaction term is −0.052 (S.E. = 0.025, p=0.048). In contrast, both
coefficients are near zero in the only-treated specification.
Although the results are not uniform across specifications, taking the point estimates
seriously points to an interesting story: low-homeownership places increase LIHTC permits
following electoral reforms, while high-homeownership towns instead decrease them. This
pattern makes sense in light of research showing that the effect of LIHTC on nearby home
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prices is positive in low-income areas and negative in high-income areas (Baum-Snow and
Marion 2009; Diamond and McQuade 2019), as well as Hankinson’s (2018) finding that
homeowners are more likely to oppose low-income developments when close to their residence,
while renters are not. Ward voting in low-ownership places could allow low-income districts
to gain a seat on town council and advocate for the benefits of LIHTC in their area, while, in
wealthy high-ownership towns, it primarily empowers nearby residents who want to protect
their property values.
4.3 Mechanisms
Even given correct causal estimates, the underlying mechanism linking electoral reforms
to housing supply may not be related to decentralization and NIMBYism. One possibility is
that the administrative burden of changing electoral rules could slow the permitting process
or cause developers to delay plans. However, it seems unlikely that this would persist for
many years after the reform, and, as shown in Panel C of Appendix Table A.3, towns that
switch from ward to at-large voting do not see decreased permits.
Alternatively, over a longer time period, a ward-elected council could set nonhousing
policies that make a town less attractive to developers. But the timing again does not support
this story—the effect of the reform occurs immediately, before these policy changes could be
implemented and pass through to construction. In addition, Appendix Table A.4 repeats the
main DD specifications using other town characteristics as the dependent variable. Across
the three specifications and three dependent variables, only one estimate is statistically
significant. This is inconsistent with large indirect effects of the reform that pass through to
housing markets. Similarly, Column 3 of Appendix Table A.2 shows estimates of the effect
on total units with added controls for time-varying town characteristics (percent white,
percent owner occupancy, and population). The coefficients of interest are similar to the
baseline specification, suggesting that indirect effects of reforms cannot explain the housing
production result.
The strongest support for decentralization and NIMBYism as the causal mechanism may
be the heterogeneity across towns and unit types. My proposed mechanism naturally explains
the observed larger effects for multifamily units and in high-homeownership towns, while the
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most obvious alternatives do not. Finally, given the extent of town councils’ control over
land-use regulation and their limited role in areas of policy handled by state and federal
governments, it makes sense that their effect on the housing market would occur primarily
through this channel.
5 Conclusion
The shortfall in housing construction has attracted increased attention as U.S. housing
costs rise. A contributing factor may be that land-use regulation and development approvals
are controlled at a very local level, and policymakers aiming to spur construction have begun
to target this feature of housing policy. For example, Oregon has limited how restrictive
municipal zoning regulation can be, and California has increased enforcement of state targets
for local housing production. At the local level, Minneapolis eliminated single-family zoning,
making it more difficult for ward representatives to block denser developments.
Despite the increased attention, there is little empirical evidence on the importance of
local control of housing regulations. In this paper, I exploit changes in electoral rules that
provide a rare source of exogenous variation in local control. My findings support conven-
tional wisdom and anecdotal evidence of NIMBYism, as the reform reduces local housing
production by over 20 percent. However, I emphasize two caveats. First, I do not measure
potential welfare gains from more decentralized control, whether through housing markets or
elsewhere (such as increased minority representation from ward voting). Second, while the
forces underlying my proposed mechanism are quite general, I study a specific policy, and re-
sults may not generalize to every situation. Most proposed reforms consider decreasing local
control, and applying my findings to this setting requires a symmetry assumption. Similarly,
towns within a region are a parallel setting, but more research is needed to determine the
effect of decentralization at that level of government.
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Figure 1: Baseline Event Study for Total Units Permitted
NOTE: This figure shows event study coefficients from the estimation of Equation (1)
with log(total units + 1) as the dependent variable. Year 0 is the year that a town
approved a switch from at-large to ward elections. The dummies for years to treatment
are bundled into two-year bins, and the label on the x-axis represents the later year.
The specification includes town fixed effects and county-year fixed effects, and errors are
clustered at the state level.
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Figure 2: Baseline Event Study for Single- and Multifamily Units Permitted
NOTE: This figure shows event study coefficients from two separate estimations of Equa-
tion (1), with log(single-family units + 1) and log(multifamily units + 1) as the dependent
variables. Year 0 is the year that a town approved a switch from at-large to ward elec-
tions. The dummies for years to treatment are bundled into two-year bins, and the label
on the x-axis represents the later year. The specification includes town fixed effects and
county-year fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 1: Comparison of Treatment and Control Towns
Population Percent white New units per 1,000 Owner occupancy
Panel A: Characteristics levels
Ever switch 18,645 41,103 −0.096 −0.058 2.110 −0.063 −0.034 −0.059
(S.E.) (6,054) (13,768) (0.019) (0.023) (1.147) (1.648) (0.011) (0.023)
Constant 15,910 18,093 0.90 0.85 7.15 6.20 0.63 0.62
(S.E.) (2,189) (465) (0.015) (0.001) (1.011) (0.056) (0.012) (0.001)
N 9,772 9,772 9,772 9,772 9,772 9,772 9,772 9,772
Time FE Year County-year Year County-year Year County-year Year County-year
Panel B: Decadal percent change in characteristics
Ever switch 0.048 −0.012 −0.016 −0.019 −0.267 −0.139 0.009 −0.002
(S.E.) (0.050) (0.067) (0.010) (0.019) (0.102) (0.134) (0.005) (0.014)
Constant 0.20 0.22 −0.05 −0.05 0.10 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(S.E.) (0.049) (0.002) (0.015) (0.001) (0.111) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000)
N 9,386 9,386 9,386 9,386 6,149 6,149 9,386 9,386
Time FE Year County-year Year County-year Year County-year Year County-year
Panel C: Decadal percent change in characteristics (only treated observations)
Decade before switch −0.046 −0.027 0.002 0.003 −0.169 −0.081 0.006 0.007
(S.E.) (0.049) (0.068) (0.007) (0.008) (0.122) (0.105) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 0.18 0.18 −0.07 −0.07 −0.09 −0.10 −0.03 −0.03
(S.E.) (0.012) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.016) (0.001) (0.002)
N 838 805 838 805 543 515 838 805
FE Town, Town, Town, Town, Town, Town, Town, Town,
year state-year year state-year year state-year year state-year
NOTE: This table compares characteristics of treatment and control towns. Panel A depicts regressions of the variable in
the column heading on an indicator for if a town ever switches from at-large to ward voting, as well as a vector of either year
or county-year fixed effects. Years after the reform are dropped for treated towns. Panel B repeats the exercise using decadal
changes as the dependent variable. Panel C restricts to treated towns and regresses changes in the dependent variable on an
indicator for the decade before the reform, as well as town and either year or state-year fixed effects. In all specifications,
only decennial census years are included and errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 2: Difference-in-Differences Results
Log(Total+1) Log(Multifamily+1) Log(Single-Family+1) 1(LIHTC)
Panel A: Baseline
After*treated −0.236 −0.478 −0.118 −0.008
(S.E.) (0.059) (0.145) (0.055) (0.025)
Constant 3.21 1.34 2.90 0.08
(S.E.) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 65,952 65,952 65,952 50,869
Control group All All All All
Time FE County-year County-year County-year County-year
Panel B: Only treated
After*treated −0.242 −0.484 −0.163 0.020
(S.E.) (0.076) (0.088) (0.076) (0.024)
Constant 4.17 2.50 3.74 0.14
(S.E.) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.012)
Observations 3,396 3,396 3,396 2,142
Control group Treated Treated Treated Treated
Time FE State-year State-year State-year State-year
Panel C: Matched sample
After*treated −0.123 −0.229 −0.055 0.013
(S.E.) (0.041) (0.065) (0.035) (0.015)
Constant 3.41 1.64 3.06 0.11
(S.E.) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 35,325 35,325 35,325 26,396
Control group Matched Matched Matched Matched
Time FE State-year State-year State-year State-year
NOTE: This table shows results from the difference-in-differences specification in Equa-
tion (2). The column heading denotes the dependent variable. Panel A represents the
baseline specifications, which includes the full analysis sample. Panel B includes only
observations that are treated at some point in the sample period, while Panel C restricts
to the matched sample described in Section 3.3. The specifications include town fixed
effects and the time fixed effects indicated in each panel. Errors are clustered at the state
level.
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Table 3: Heterogeneity by Homeownership Rate
Log(Total+1) Log(Multifamily+1) Log(Single-Family+1) 1(LIHTC)
Panel A: Baseline
After*treated*high ownership −0.064 −0.522 −0.021 −0.074
(0.143) (0.324) (0.104) (0.034)
After*treated −0.210 −0.202 −0.130 0.029
(0.095) (0.212) (0.068) (0.038)
Observations 65,931 65,931 65,931 48,975
Control group All All All All
Time FE County-year County-year County-year County-year
Panel B: Only treated
After*treated*high ownership −0.164 −0.722 0.007 0.006
(0.124) (0.236) (0.148) (0.050)
After*treated −0.139 −0.090 −0.148 0.020
(0.112) (0.128) (0.136) (0.043)
Observations 3,337 3,337 3,337 2,040
Control group Treated Treated Treated Treated
Time FE State-year State-year State-year State-year
Panel C: Matched sample
After*treated*high ownership −0.094 −0.313 −0.014 −0.052
(0.115) (0.238) (0.083) (0.025)
After*treated −0.078 −0.060 −0.063 0.036
(0.067) (0.121) (0.060) (0.023)
Observations 35,325 35,325 35,325 25,677
Control group Matched Matched Matched Matched
Time FE State-year State-year State-year State-year
NOTE: This table shows how the effect of ward voting varies in towns with different owner-occupancy rates. High ownership
is defined as above the median in the set of treated towns. The specification, shown in Equation (3), is similar to the primary
exercise, but also includes the after × treated × high-ownership dummy and a vector of year × high-ownership fixed effects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Years of Changes from At-Large to Ward Voting
NOTE: This figure shows the approval years of at-large to ward reforms reported in the
1981–2011 ICMA Municipal Form of Government surveys. Because the 1986 wave asks
only if a reform was approved between 1981–1986 and does not specify the exact year,
reforms reported in this wave are randomly allocated to a year between 1981 and 1986
in the figure in order to prevent an artificial peak in 1986.
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Figure A.2: Long-Run Trends in Housing Units Permitted
NOTE: This figure shows the number of housing units permitted in the average town in
the analysis sample in each year of the Census Building Permits data.
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Figure A.3: Event Study for LIHTC Units
NOTE: This figure shows event study coefficients from the estimation of Equation (1) with
1(LIHTC permits) as the dependent variable. Year 0 is the year that a town approved a
switch from at-large to ward elections. The dummies for years to treatment are bundled
into two-year bins, and the label on the x-axis represents the later year. The specification
includes town fixed effects and county-year fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the
state level.
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Figure A.4: Event Study for Total Units Permitted (Treated Towns)
NOTE: This figure shows event study coefficients from the estimation of Equation (1)
with log(total units + 1) as the dependent variable. Year 0 is the year that a town
approved a switch from at-large to ward elections. The dummies for years to treatment
are bundled into two-year bins, and the label on the x-axis represents the later year.
The specification includes town fixed effects and state-year fixed effects, and errors are
clustered at the state level. Only towns that switch from at-large to ward voting during
the sample period are included.
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Figure A.5: Event Study for Single- and Multifamily Units Permitted (Treated Towns)
NOTE: This figure shows event study coefficients from two separate estimations of Equa-
tion (1), with log(single-family units + 1) and log(multifamily units + 1) as the dependent
variables. Year 0 is the year that a town approved a switch from at-large to ward elec-
tions. The dummies for years to treatment are bundled into two-year bins, and the label
on the x-axis represents the later year. The specification includes town fixed effects and
state-year fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the state level. Only towns that switch
from at-large to ward voting during the sample period are included.
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Figure A.6: Event Study for Total Units Permitted (Matched Sample)
NOTE: This figure shows event study coefficients from the estimation of Equation (1)
with log(total units + 1) as the dependent variable. Year 0 is the year that a town
approved a switch from at-large to ward elections. The dummies for years to treatment
are bundled into two-year bins, and the label on the x-axis represents the later year.
The specification includes town fixed effects and state-year fixed effects, and errors are
clustered at the state level. Only treated towns and towns in the matched sample are
included.
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Figure A.7: Event Study for Single- and Multi-Family Units Permitted (Matched Sample)
Note: This figure shows event study coefficients from two separate estimations of Equa-
tion (1), with log(single-family units + 1) and log(multi-family units + 1) as the depen-
dent variables. Year 0 is the year that a town approved a switch from at-large to ward
elections. The dummies for years to treatment are bundled into two-year bins, and the
label on the x-axis represents the later year. The specification includes town fixed effects
and state-year fixed effects, and errors are clustered at the state level. Only treated towns
and towns in the matched sample are included.
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Figure A.8: Event Studies for Early and Late Adopters
Note: This figure shows event study coefficients from two separate estimations of Equa-
tion (1). The coefficients labeled Early Adopters are from an estimation including only
towns that reformed prior to 1995 in the treatment group. The Late Adopters estimation
includes only towns that reformed after 1986. The specifications are otherwise identical
to the baseline.
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Table A.1: Characteristics of Treatment and Control Towns in 1980
Population Percent white Units per 1,000 Owner occupancy
25th percentile 5,650 3,979 0.684 0.877 0.003 0.001 0.532 0.557
Median 11,481 7,122 0.796 0.957 0.005 0.003 0.587 0.637
75th percentile 35,724 15,538 0.934 0.984 0.010 0.007 0.657 0.711
Mean 35,411 15,833 0.789 0.904 0.010 0.007 0.594 0.632
N 206 2,309 206 2,309 206 2,309 206 2,309
Sample Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
NOTE: This table shows the 1980 characteristics of those towns that switched from
at-large to ward voting after 1980.
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Table A.2: Robustness of Difference-in-Differences Estimates
IHS(units) Longer postperiod Drop treatment years Add characteristics
Panel A: Baseline
After*treated −0.237 −0.284 −0.252 −0.220
(S.E.) (0.061) (0.087) (0.070) (0.057)
Constant 3.75 3.25 3.20 2.45
(S.E.) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.292)
Observations 65,952 68,577 65,698 65,638
Control group All All All All
Time FE County-year County-year County-year County-year
Panel B: Only treated
After*treated −0.252 −0.131 −0.351 −0.241
(S.E.) (0.079) (0.090) (0.106) (0.075)
Constant 4.78 3.97 4.22 2.35
(S.E.) (0.026) (0.062) (0.039) (0.935)
Observations 3,404 7,540 3,023 3,395
Control group Treated Treated Treated Treated
Time FE State-year State-year State-year State-year
Panel C: Matched sample
After*treated −0.129 −0.183 −0.131 −0.132
(S.E.) (0.044) (0.052) (0.042) (0.040)
Constant 3.97 3.45 3.40 1.38
(S.E.) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.466)
Observations 35,325 38,748 34,954 35,316
Control group Matched Matched Matched Matched
Time FE State-year State-year State-year State-year
NOTE: This table repeats the baseline difference-in-differences estimation for total units
permitted with four tweaks to the specification. Column 1 uses the inverse hyperbolic sine
of total units instead of log(total units + 1). Column 2 drops the restriction on the number
of post-reform years included in the specification. Column 3 drops the year the reform
was approved and the previous year. Column 4 adds time-varying town characteristics
(population, percent owner occupied, and percent white) as control variables.
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Table A.3: Alternative Treatment Definitions
All units Multifamily units Single-family Units 1(LIHTC)
Panel A: Unreported switches
After*treated −0.190 −0.197 −0.150 −0.007
(S.E.) (0.046) (0.081) (0.043) (0.015)
Constant 3.22 1.35 2.91 0.08
(S.E.) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 69,793 69,793 69,793 53,539
Control group All All All All
Time FE County-year County-year County-year County-year
Panel B: Ward or mixed
After*treated −0.185 −0.380 −0.105 0.004
(S.E.) (0.072) (0.144) (0.058) (0.025)
Constant 3.21 1.35 2.91 0.08
(S.E.) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 66,347 66,347 66,347 51,099
Control group All All All All
Time FE County-year County-year County-year County-year
Panel C: Ward to at-large
After*treated −0.051 0.054 −0.066 0.017
(S.E.) (0.077) (0.124) (0.056) (0.017)
Constant 3.31 1.66 2.94 0.11
(S.E.) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 43,319 43,319 43,319 32,964
Control group All All All All
Time FE County-year County-year County-year County-year
NOTE: This table shows results from alternative treatment definitions. Panel A expands
the treatment definition to include towns that report an at-large council in one survey
wave and a ward in the next (setting the treatment year to the midpoint of the gap
between the two survey years). Panel B includes towns that report switching from at-
large to mixed voting, as well as the baseline treated towns that report switching from
at-large to purely ward voting. Finally, Panel C defines the treatment as reporting a
ward system in one wave and an at-large in the next, again setting the treatment year
to the midpoint of the two waves.
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Table A.4: Effect of Reforms on Other Town Characteristics
Log(Population) Percent white Owner occupancy
Panel A: Baseline
After*treated −0.047 −0.012 0.002
(S.E.) (0.032) (0.012) (0.005)
Constant 9.36 0.84 0.63
(S.E.) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 7,051 7,051 7,051
Control group All All All
Time FE County-year County-year County-year
Panel B: Only treated
After*treated −0.087 −0.001 0.000
(S.E.) (0.039) (0.007) (0.008)
Constant 9.74 0.76 0.58
(S.E.) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 424 424 424
Control group Treated Treated Treated
Time FE State-year State-year State-year
Panel C: Matched sample
After*treated 0.005 0.001 0.002
(S.E.) (0.023) (0.008) (0.003)
Constant 9.46 0.81 0.58
(S.E.) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 3,859 3,859 3,859
Control group Matched Matched Matched
Time FE State-year State-year State-year
NOTE: This figure repeats the baseline difference-in-differences specifications using town
characteristics as the dependent variables. Because characteristics are only observed in
decennial census years, only those years are included in the sample.
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